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MARKET POWER WITH DYNAMIC INVENTORY CONSTRAINTS: 
THE BIAS IN STANDARD MEASURES 
Lynn Hunnicutt and David Aadland 
ABSTRACT 
111 
This paper incorporates inventory dynamics into an analysis of market power. Using a 
model in which each fIrm accounts for the effect of its current action on the current and future 
actions of itself and its competitors, we show that measures of market power that ignore inventory 
dynamics are biased. We then apply the model to the beef-packing industry using annual data on 
cattle stocks, slaughter and prices from 1933-1999. Our estimates suggest that static measures 
overestimate the amount of market power exerted by beef-packing fIrms. 
MARKET POWER WITH DYNAMIC INVENTORY CONSTRAINTS: 
THE BIAS IN STANDARD MEASURES* 
I. Introduction 
II any studies of market power are based on measures derived from a static model of competition . 
For example, in examining market power , t he Department of Justice relies on the Lerner index , 
various concentration ra tios and t he Hirschman-Herfindahl index , all of which are derived from a 
model of competit ion tha t assumes firms m aximize profits period by period. Intertemporal effects 
are not easily accounted for in t hese standard measures . Yet we knO\l\ that current output choices 
may affect fu t ure possibilities through inventory dynamics. If there is a lag in input production, 
decisions regarding how much input to use in one period may influence how much is available in 
t he future. rvIodels which account for these inventory dynamics will thus more accurately describe 
competit ion. Using an oligopoly/oligopsony model of competition , we provide an exact character-
ization of how inventory dynamics affect market-power measures. We then apply our model to 
t he b eef-packing industry and demonstrate that ignoring inventory dynamics does indeed lead to 
biased estimates of market power. 
Several papers have examined the appropriateness of using a static framework to model dynamic 
competit ion (see, for example Pindyck (1985) , Riordan (1985) , Driskill and McCafferty (1989), 
Fershtman and Kamien (1987) , and Dockner (1992)). The paper most similar to ours is Roberts 
and Samuelson (1988). They develop a dynamic conjectural variations (CV) model that examines 
the effect of advertising on product demand. As in our model , advertising affects both current 
and fu t ure profits , which will be recognized by sophisticated firms. There are, however, important 
differences between the two studies. First , in contrast to Roberts and Samuelson (1988) , who 
compare open and closed-loop equilibrium strategies, we compare a closed-loop equilibrium with 
one derived from a static model. 1 Since the static model is the standard framework for estimating 
market power in beef packing, it facilitates easier comparison to others in the literature. Second, our 
inventory measure is the total U.S. stock of cows, for which data are readily available and which has 
well-known laws of motion. In contrast , the inventory measure in Roberts and Samuelson (1988) is 
the stock of consumer goodwill that cigarette advertising generates , for which data are not directly 
available and dynamics are not well understood. 
As in Riordan (1985) , Driskill and lVIcCafferty (1989) and Fershtman and Kamien (1987) , we 
fi nd that fi rms appear more competit ive in an explicit ly dynamic model than in the standard (static) 
*This research was supported by cooperative research agreement 99-ESS with the USDA Grain Inspection, Packers 
& Stockyards Administration. Opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
USDA GIPSA. Additional support has been provided by the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station under project number 
UTA-OOO 11, and by the Research Institute on Livestock Pricing, Virginia Polytechnic and State University. Please send all 
correspondence regarding this work to Lynn Hunnicutt at hunnicut@econ.usu.edu. We thank Dee Von Bailey, John Keith, Arthur 
Caplan, and Kala Krishna for helpful conversations regarding this work. The usual caveat applies. 
IAn "open-loop" solution assumes that a firm's current period choice may affect its rivals' current period choices and 
its own future choices, but not its rivals' future choices. A "closed-loop" solution allows all three effects to ·be non-zero. 
CV model. Intuitively, one can think of our model as involving a larger number of "firms" since 
future versions of all competitors are considered in current decisions. Firm i must now consider 
not only its competitor in the current period, but future versions of itself and its competitor. For 
example, a current increase in purchases of inputs will reduce the inventory of inputs available in 
the future , increasing future prices. Any attempt to exert current market power by purchasing 
more inputs without increasing prices will lead to reduced future input availability and ability to 
exercise market power. Thus "future" versions of firms i and j may constrain firm i's current 
pricing behavior. 
Our notion of inventory dynamics arises in industries where there is a lag between the need for 
an input and its availability. The airline industry faces this problem in two senses. First , delivery 
of a new plane generally occurs at least a year after the order is placed, so that airlines ' orders need 
to account for competitors' current and future responses. Second, simply moving planes and crews 
between cities occurs with a lag. For example, a plane used to fly from city A to city B may not 
be immediately available to replace an aircraft with mechanical problems at city C. This potential 
delay in availability might reduce the number of flights from A to B offered each day in order to 
reduce the time needed to respond to the problem at city C. Inventory dynamics (associated with 
ordering new planes or moving planes and crews between cities) often constrain current output 
choices in a manner that is not captured by static models of oligopoly competition. 
Livestock markets provide another good example of inventory dynamics. Cattle markets , for 
instance, contain a natural intertemporal link since beef cows serve both as consumption goods in 
beef production and as capital goods in calf production. Rosen, Murphy and Scheinkman (1994) 
incorporate this intertemporal link in a model designed to explain the regular cycle in U.S. cattle 
stocks. In their model, ranchers are forward-looking and recognize that current decisions regarding 
the number of cattle to cull from the herd influence future stocks. 2 It seems reasonable that beef-
packing firms also incorporate the cattle cycle into their pricing and marketing decisions (in fact , 
the USDA Economic Research Service in its Agricultural Outlook series describes the link between 
the cattle cycle and fed beef marketings). As a result, when measuring the market power in 
industries associated with livestock (such as beef-packing) , it is likely that stock dynamics will play 
an important role. 
There is a large literature concerning market power in beef packing. The proliferation of research 
on this issue is understandable, given that the four-firm concentration ratio in beef packing has 
2We use the terms "inventory" and "stock" interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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increased from below 30% in the early 1970s to 80% in 1996 (Mathews Jr. , Hahn , Nelson , Duewer 
and Gustafson (1999)). Most investigations use the standard CV model which assumes that packing 
firms consider only current period effects in their livestock purchasing decisions (see , for example, 
Schroeter (1987), Schroeter and Azzam (1990), Bhuyan and Lopez (1997), Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1998)).3 Given the literature cited above, as well as a number of articles that treat cattle stocks 
as capital goods (Jarvis (1974) , Trapp (1986), Rosen et al. (1994) and Nerlove and Fornari (1998)), 
such an omission is surprising. Indeed , Schroeter and Azzam (1990) note on page 1374 that the 
standard CV approach "approximate[s] an inherently dynamic problem with a static model." 
Our model gives an exact representation of the bias induced by using a static model to describe 
dynamic competition. Furthermore, our empirical estimates indicate that this bias is substantially 
different from zero. As noted above, and consistent with theoretical predictions from alternative 
models, we find that static (hereafter we refer to them as "myopic") CV models tend to exaggerate 
the exercise of market power when applied to markets where dynamic inventory constraints are 
important.4 
2 Model 
2.1 The basics 
We develop a model that includes the possibility that firms account for inventory dynamics in their 
optimization problem. In order to generate closed-form solutions, we model two firms (i = 1,2), 
each choosing how much of an input xi to purchase and process in each period. To ease notation, 
we assume that production involves a Leontief technology, where the input is transformed one-for-
one into output. This assumption is without loss of generality, as long as the production function 
is increasing in xi.5 Let X = xl + x 2 denote the aggregate input purchases and the output that 
3Koontz, Garcia and Hudson (1993), Azzam and Park (1993) , and Weliwita and Azzam (1996) take an entirely 
different approach and use a repeated game framework to look for collusive behaviour on the part of packing firms . 
4We do not address the appropriateness of the conduct assumptions made in the CV model. Corts (1999) points 
out that estimates of market power from a CV model will not accurately describe conduct unless firms behave 
precisely as the model assumes . For example, if firm behavior is not as the Cournot model postulates , conclusions 
derived from estimating a model of Cournot competition will not be accurate . The weaknesses of the CV approach 
are well known , yet analyses based on the model continue to be used by many academic economists and policymakers . 
Given that firms do behave as the Cournot model postulates , our extension produces estimating equations that will 
lead to a more accurate assessment of market power. 
5To see this, define the production function for firm i as g(x~ ). Then , the total amount available for sale is given 
by G(Xt ) = L i g(xD, and the demand curve would be given by p = p(G(Xt )) . As long as G'(Xt ) ~ 0, we lose nothing 
by using X t in its place . 
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is supplied in the period. The inverse demand function is given by p = p(X),where p'(X) < O. 
Processing costs incurred by each firm in transforming the raw input into output are c( xi). Inputs 
are purchased from suppliers following the inverse supply function w = w(X, S) , where S represents 
the stock level in the current period. By including S in the supply function, we allow for the 
possibility that input suppliers consider current stock levels , as well as prices when deciding how 
much to supply. Input prices are positively related to X (wx > 0) and inversely related to S 
(ws < 0). The inverse relationship with stock levels occurs because suppliers are assumed to be 
willing to sell animals at a lower price when the animal is easily replaced (i.e. , when S is large). 
Inventory dynamics are represented by the equation St+l = f(St , Xt) , where fs > 0 and f x < O. 
The objective for firm i is to choose xi each period to maximize the present value of the sum 
of per-period operating profits , 7ft(p , w) = p(Xt)xi - w(Xt, St)xi - c(xi), subject to the inventory 
dynamics , the actions of rival firm j, and So given. This discounted profit stream is given by 
where f3 = 1/(1 + p) and p is the market rate of interest. 
There are three effects to consider in this model. The first is the standard oligopoly/oligopsony 
effect - the current quantity choice made by firm i affects the current profits of firm j (i # j) and 
therefore firm j 's current choice. This effect occurs within each period. The next two effects arise 
because the current quantity chosen by firm i affects input supplies available in the future. The 
direct dynamic externality (DDE) arises because the current choice of xi affects the future stock 
and therefore firm i's own future input choices. The indirect dynamic externality (IDE) occurs 
because the current choice of xi also affects firm j 's future input choices, again through the effect 
on future stocks. We call the first externality "direct" because it gives the effect of i's future choices 
on its own current choice. The "indirect" externality gives the effect of firm j's future choices on 
firm i's current choice. 
To incorporate these dynamic externalities, we assume that firm i believes that its rival's 
quantity is given by x j = x j (xi, S). Consistent with standard oligopoly/oligopsony models, let 
r j == dx j (xi, S) / dxi denote the rate at which firm j's quantity adjusts with xi, and let Ri == 
dX / dxi = 1 + r j denote the rate at which market output adjusts with xi . Finally, let c and 
TJ denote the price elasticity of demand (p( X) / X p' (X)) and the input cost elasticity of supply 
(w(X ,S)/Xwx(X, S)) , respectively. It is common to express the rate at which market output ad-
justs with xi in elasticity form , ei = (xi dX) / (dxi X) = xi Ri / X; thus ei is the conjectural elasticity 
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parameter for firm i. 
U sing two firms allows for an exact characterization of the effect of dynamic considerations. 
Modeling competition between three or more firms makes the theoretic framework intractable, 
because firms may now have conjectures about other firms ' conjectures. The problem of more than 
two firms is indirectly addressed in Bresnahan (1989) , who notes that conjectures in industries 
with more than two competitors can be estimated using a duopoly / duopsony framework if one 
assumes that all firms have the same conjecture in a given period or that each firm 's conjecture 
does not change over time. Due to data limitations, we make the first assumption. As suggested by 
Bresnahan (1989), this allows us to reduce the oligopoly model to two firms - firm i (the one being 
studied) and firm j (anyone of the other firms). The second assumption was used by Roberts and 
Samuelson (1988) , who estimated a dynamic CV model of advertising in the cigarette industry. 
This approach requires disaggregated data with information regarding individual firms, observed 
over time. Given such a panel data set, one could test both the assumption of identical conjectures 
across firms and identical conjectures over time. 
2.2 Deriving the dynamic market-power measures 
We study the equilibrium market outcome under a closed-loop solution. The closed-loop output 
policy will identify each firm's optimal quantity as a function of the current period cattle stock, 
x~ = xi(St). Because firm i understands that j's quantity decision is also conditional on St, the 
closed-loop conjecture (firm i's belief about what firm j considers in its choice) is xj(xi(St) , St) . 
Aggregate quantity in the market, according to firm i, is thus X(St) = xi(St) + xj(xi(St) , St). 
From firm i 's first-order condition for profit maximization, we derive equation (1) , which gives 
the marginal value of the last unit of stock used in period t (At): 
(1) 
where functional dependence on X and S is implied, At = Pt - Wt - c~(x~) + (p~ - WX,t)x~~ and 
Nt+1 = (P~+l - WX,t+l)X~+l· To obtain this equation, we substitute firm i 's belief about aggregate 
market quantity into its profit function and simplify the resulting first-order condition. Because 
the algebra is straightforward but tedious , the derivation is deferred to appendix A. 
Equation 1 is the analog to a standard investment rule. It says that firm i equates marginal 
profits across periods. As noted, the left-hand side (At) is the marginal value of the last unit of 
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stock used in current production. It includes the oligopoly (oligopsony) effect. The right-hand side 
is the marginal value of foregone input use (i.e. , the marginal value of an investment in input stock). 
This term includes the discounted change in inventory levels (-{3fx~) , the DDE or the effect of 
x~ on x~+ 1 through stocks (At+ 1 (dx~+ 1/ dSt+ 1) ) , the IDE or the effect of x~ on xi+ 1 through stocks 
(Nt+l(8x~+1/8St+l)) ' and firm i 's consideration of input supplier response to a change in inventory 
levels (WS,t+lX~+l). 
Equation 1 can be expressed in a more familiar way as the closed-loop Lerner index (also derived 
in appendix A) , 
(2) 
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where £c = (Pt-Wt-WX,tX~~-c~)/Pt and ~ = -({3 fx ~/Pt) [At+1 (dX~+l/dSt+I)+Nt+l (8xi+l/8St+l)-
WS,t+lX~+l]· 
The first right-hand term (-e~/ct) is the Lerner index that is commonly estimated in myopic 
models of market power. The second term, ~, represents the consideration firm i gives to the effect 
of its current choices on future choices through changes in the inventories. Assuming that ~ is not 
zero, the myopic measure of market power (-e~/ ct) does not accurately describe the amount by 
which firms are able to raise price above marginal cost. 
The myopic index accurately describes market power in a few special cases. First, if firms do 
not care about future returns ({3 = 0), equation 2 collapses to the myopic Lerner index. Second, 
the Lerner index is equal to zero in a competitive market, which occurs when Ri = ei = 0 (i.e., 
when individual firms realize that their output decisions do not affect market quantity X). Under 
perfect competition the forward-looking Lerner index is equivalent to the myopic index (both are 
zero) because firms cannot be assured that they will be the claimants of the returns from investing 
in the stock. Third, ~ = 0 could occur if the DDE, IDE and input suppliers' reaction cancel one 
another out, which is unlikely (as noted by Dockner (1992)). 
Equation 1 can also be manipulated to measure market power in the input market. Let MC 
denote the difference between marginal revenue product (net of marginal processing cost) and input 
price, normalized by the input price. Then, as we derive in appendix A, 
M C = e~ + r 
'TJt 
(3) 
whereMc = (Pt-Wt+p~x~R~-cD/wt andr = - (f3fxRUwt) [At+l(dx~+1/dSt+l)+Nt+l(8xi+l/8St+I)-
As with the Lerner index, M C is equal to the myopic measure eVTJt plus an adjustment that 
accounts for the value of investing in the stock. The adjustment includes the DDE, IDE, and 
anticipated input supplier response. As with the Lerner index, this adjustment term is unlikely 
to be zero. NIodels that do not include the discounted profit stream in the firm 's maximization 
problem will not include this adjustment and may therefore draw inaccurate conclusions regarding 
market power. 
2.3 Determining the bias in myopic market-power measures 
The forward-looking market-power measures given in equations 2 and 3 indicate that myopic 
models are likely to produce biased estimates of market power. Unfortunately, the direction 
of the bias is not pinned down by theory. We see that the closed-loop Lerner index (£C) is 
smaller than the corresponding static measure (£S = -eV ct) if and only if 6. is negative. Re-
call that 6. = -(f3fxBit/Pt)[At+l(dx~+l/dSt+l) + Nt+l(aX~+l/aSt+d - WS,t+lX~+l]. We know 
that -(3fx /Pt is positive. It seems reasonable that market output (input use) will not decrease 
with an increase in firm i's input use, since competitors are not likely to overcompensate for 
changes firm i makes. If we make this assumption, then Bit > 0 and the myopic Lerner index 
is biased upward (i.e. the closed-loop index is smaller than the myopic index) if and only if 
[At+l(dx~+l/dSt+l) + Nt+l(aX~+l/aSt+l) - WS,t+lX~+l] < O. Substituting in for At+l and Nt+b 
this condition is equivalent to 
(4) 
The direction of the bias thus depends on the sign and relative magnitudes of the three terms in 
equation 4. The sign of the first term is indeterminate in our dynamic framework (although it 
would be zero in a static model because it includes the first-order condition for period-by-period 
profit maximization). If demand and supply curves have standard slopes , P~+l - WX,t+l is negative. 
Thus the second term is negative as long as firm j's input use responses are positively related to 
changes in stock levels. The third term is positive because Ws < O. Therefore , the overall bias is 
the sum of three terms - one of indeterminate sign, one likely negative , and one positive. As a 
result , the direction and size of the bias in the myopic Lerner index are not determined within the 
model and become an empirical matter. 
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Similar calculations for signing the bias can be performed on the myopIC measure of input 
market power. Using the same techniques as for the Lerner index, we can show that Me < MS if 
and only if 
(5) 
Since both p and ware positive, the bias in the input market-power measure has the same sign as 
the bias in the Lerner index. As before, signing this bias is an empirical matter. 
3 Estimating the model 
3.1 Deriving the empirical specification 
The theoretical results presented above suggest that market-power measures based on myopic CV 
models are biased. In this section we apply our forward-looking model of competition to the U.S. 
beef-packing industry to estimate the sign and magnitude of the bias. 
Our first task is to derive econometric equations based on the theoretical conditions provided 
above. Before doing so, a note on cattle production is appropriate. One of the most important 
decisions for cattle producers is whether to send female calves to slaughter or retain them for 
addition to their breeding stock. Most of the female calves sent to slaughter are not slaughtered 
immediately but rather go through a process called backgrounding and finishing. Backgrounding 
typically involves a four to six month period when a weaned calf is maintained on pasture or 
harvested forage before entering the feedlot. Finishing then involves transfering the animal to a 
feedlot where it will be fed high-concentrate grains for another four to six months.6 We refer to 
the meat from these animals as "fed beef." 
Heifers that are not sent to slaughter typically become part of the producer 's breeding stock. 
Breeding cows can produce at most a single calf per year, have a gestation period of nine months , 
and are typically bred for the first time in their second or third year of life. A breeding cow may 
then be retained and bred in subsequent years until approximately her tenth year. At this point , 
her reproductive abilities begin to deteriorate. Culled cows are sent directly to slaughter as their 
beef is of lower quality and is not suitable for finishing. We refer to the meat from culled cows as 
"non-fed beef." We focus our attention on the fed-beef market , because it makes up approximately 
OWe assume that backgrounding and finishing of animals is completed by the cattle producers. This simplifies the 
analysis by removing the need to explicitly model feedlot behavior. Furthermore, it becomes more straightforward 
to conceptualize how cattle producers respond to current price signals by changing the number of fed heifers sent to 
the packers. 
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80% of the domestic market for beef (although we do account for cull cows in the stock-dynamic 
equation below). 
A single "period" III the theoretical section represents three years in the cattle industry, as 
there is approximately a three-year lag between the investment decision (retention of a cow) and 
the resulting output (slaughter of her offspring). Since we use annual data in the empirical section, 
we reformulate the theoretical model so that a period is one year long, and stock dynamics take 
place over several years. Thus, a cow that is bred at the beginning of period t will produce offspring 
that may be marketed at the end of period t + 2 or bred at the beginning of period t + 3. We 
specify the following three-year lag structure for stock dynamics 
(6) 
where St is the stock of breeding females (cows) at time t, X t IS the number of young females 
(heifers) slaughtered at the end of period t, 10 = (1 - 0)(1 - ex), 12 = (1 - 0)20.5g, 0 is the death 
rate, g is the birthing rate, ex is the cull rate for cows (i.e., fraction of the cow stock slaughtered 
each period). The intuition behind equation 6 is clear and is similar to the laws of motion for 
cattle inventories in Rosen et al. (1994) and Baak (1999). The total stock of cows can change for 
two reasons: (1) cows from period t may die or get sent to slaughter (,OSt) and (2) female calves 
born from cows bred in period t - 2 that do not die (/2St-2) or get sent to slaughter (Xt ) will be 
retained for addition to the breeding stock in period t + 1.7 
Using (6) as the empirical specification of f(St, Xt), it is straightfoward to apply the techniques 
in appendix A to derive the following first-order condition for beef-packing firms (see appendix B): 
(7) 
where At represents the marginal value of the last animal sent to slaughter in period t, and the 
right-hand side represents the marginal value of leaving the animal in the breeding herd. The 
intuition behind (7) is the same as for equation 1, but it is slightly more complex given the three-
year lag structure for stock dynamics. As before, if packers are forward looking, f3 will not be equal 
to zero , and static market-power estimates from At = 0 are likely to be biased. 
7 This specicfication assumes that the cull rate for cows is constant over time. Clearly this is an abstraction from 
reality, but one that greatly simplifies our analysis . Furthermore, allowing ranchers to make endogenous culling 
decisions along only one margin (heifers in our model ) is consistent with several leading studies of cattle supply (e.g ., 
Rosen et al. (1994) , Rosen (1987)) . 
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3.2 Estimating Equations 
To examine the direction and magnitude of the bias, we estimate four equations: (1) the retail 
demand for fed beef; (2) the input supply of fed heifers; (3) the packer 's equilibrium first-order 
condition (equation 7) with f3 set to zero (At = 0); and (4) equation 7 with f3 allowed to be greater 
than zero. 
We begin by assuming that the demand for fed beef can be represented by a log-linear inverse 
demand function: 
(8) 
where Pt is the retail price of fed beef, dit is disposable income, pCt is the price of chicken, PPt is the 
price of pork, and cI ,t is an error term. We hypothesize that the demand curve is downward-sloping 
(bI < 0) , fed beef is a normal good (b2 > 0), and chicken and pork are substitutes for fed beef 
(b3 , b4 > 0). 
The input supply of fed heifers is also assumed to be log-linear: 
Heifers have value both as consumption and capital goods. Their consumption value is derived 
from consumers ' demand for fed beef (8) and their capital value is derived from their ability to 
produce calves. Therefore, we model the price of heifers (Wt) as a function of the quantity supplied 
(Xt ), the stock of cows in the current period (St), and their expected value as a cow in the following 
year (pcowf+l) net of holding costs (pjeedf+I).8 To calculate future expected values, we use quasi-
rational expectations as presented in Nerlove and Fornari (1998) , which amounts to using the 
best-fitting time series model to forecast future values. For both cow and feed prices, we used 
integrated ARMA(l,l) time series models to generate forecasts. 
Studies generally suggest that the short-run supply response for heifers is positive for transitory 
price shocks and negative for permanent price shocks (Jarvis (1974) and Rosen (1987)). Therefore, 
we hypothesize that the price of heifers could be (depending on the nature of the price shocks) either 
negatively or positively related to the quantity supplied (CI ~ 0). Reductions in current stocks and 
expected feed prices , as well as increases in expected cow prices, should cause producers to retain 
!iNote that the market value of a cow will automatically incorporate feed and cattle prices further into the future 
because the value of a cow equals the net discounted stream of revenues from her calves over her productive lifetime . 
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more heifers and therefore reduce the current quantity supplied to the market. NIoving In(X) 
alone to the left-hand side of equation 9 then implies that the price of heifers should be negatively 
(positively) related to current stocks and expected feed prices and positively (negatively) related 
to expected cow prices if the slope of the supply curve is positive (negative). 
The last econometric equation is derived from the equilibrium first-order condition for packers 
(equation 7). To derive this equation, we make several simplifying assumptions. First , since we 
have aggregate data, we assume symmetry in firm conjectures (although not necessarily across 
input usage or production costs). Second, we assume that d1(= dxUdSt ), d2(= ax~/aSt), c~ and 
e~ (or equivalently Bit) are constant for all t. In other words , we assume that marginal slaughter 
rates , marginal processing costs and (as in Roberts and Samuelson (1988)) the conjectural-elasticity 
parameter do not change over timeY Furthermore, since both demand and supply are assumed 
to be log-linear, we know that P~+k = b1(pt+k/Xt+k), WX,t+k = Cl(Wt+k/Xt+k) and WS,t+k = 
C2( Wt+k/ St+k). 
In appendix C , we show that equation 7 can be rewritten as 
where e is the conjectural elasticity parameter defined above; a, d1, d2 and xi / X are constant over 
time; c3,t is a stochastic error term; and the r terms involve future prices, slaughter and stocks.10 
Exclusion of r1 ,t, r2 ,t and r3,t from (10) produces the CV estimates derived from a static model 
of competition, which implicitly assumes that packer behavior is myopic. The primary goal of this 
paper is to determine whether estimates of e from models that exclude the r terms (or equivalently 
assume that f3 = 0) are biased. That is , we are trying to discover whether aggregate stock dynamics 
matter in the market for live cattle. 
We use U.S. aggregate time series data from 1933 to 1999 to estimate the model (details about 
the data are included in appendix D). Our stock variable (S) is measured by the total number of 
cows that have calved as of January 1. Total slaughter (X) is given by the total annual number of 
9To justify this assumption, we performed a test of parameter constancy by calculating recursive coefficients for 
equation (7). That is, we begin with the sample period 1933-1963 and sequentially add a single observation to 
the end of the sample until reaching 1999 - each time calculating an updated set of coefficients. These recursive 
coefficients shows little evidence of a structural break. Due to space limitations , these results are not shown here 
but are available upon request. 
JOlt is difficult to separate the DDE and IDE in our empirical specification. However , because d 1 gives firm i's 
reaction to changes in future period stocks , it is related to the DDE. Since d2 gives firm j's reaction to changes in 
future periods, it is related to the IDE. The packers ' consideration of rancher cull decisions in response to changes 
in stocks is contained in r 1 . 
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federally inspected slaughtered heifers. The prices for heifers (w) and cull cows (pcow) are gIven 
by the USDA-reported market price at Chicago prior to 1968 and by the market price at Omaha 
thereafterJl Output prices (p) are given by the average wholesale prices of commercial dressed 
heifer and steer beef from 1933 through 1988. After 1988 the USDA stopped reporting wholesale 
prices for dressed carcasses because packing firms had begun to process carcasses into primal cuts 
and sell them in boxes. For 1989-1999, we use the wholesale boxed-beef price. The final four 
series are the price of broiler chickens (pc), the price received by farmers for hogs (pp) , the price 
of feed index (pfeed) , and U.S . disposable income (di). All nominal series are deflated by the U.S. 
consumer price index. 
3.3 Results 
Our estimation is completed in two stages. In stage one, we jointly estimate equations 8 and 9. 
Then in stage two , conditional on these estimated elasticities, we estimate the CV elasticity e in 
(10) for two cases: (i) with myopic packer behavior and (ii) with forward-looking packer behavior.12 
Equations 8 and 9 are estimated using three-stage least squares (3SLS) because of the potential 
endogeneity associated with In(X) and In(S). The set of instruments include the remaining exoge-
nous variables in the system as well as once-lagged In(S). The estimates for (10) are generated with 
an autocorrelation-corrected instrumental-variable technique. The set of instruments for (10) are 
the same as in the 3SLS estimation plus the first three lags of Wt and Pt. The results are presented 
in table 1. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
Begin by focusing on the results in the first two columns of table 1. The primary coefficients of 
interest in the estimation of equations (8) and (9) are the price elasticities with respect to slaughter 
and stocks. Since we estimated log-linear inverse demand and supply functions, the reciprocal of 
b1 gives the price elasticity of demand and the reciprocals of Cl and C2 give the price elasticities of 
11 The heifer price series begins in 1964 . Prior to 1964, we use the price of steers as our measure of wand include 
an input-price dummy variable (one after 1963; zero otherwise) to control for the break in the series. For the period 
after 1963, where both the price of heifers and steers are available, the two prices follow one another very closely with 
a correlation coefficient equal to 0.99945. 
i"l Ideally, the myopic and forward-lo oking first-order conditions for the packers would each be estimated in a system 
(imposing the appropriate cross-equation restrictions) along with the input supply and retail demand functions. 
However, given the nature of the optimizing equation for the packers , we found that both full maximum likelihood 
and generalized method of moments estimat ion tend to generate unreasonable demand and supply elasticities. We 
therefore rely on estimates from the two-stage procedure. 
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supply with respect to slaughter and stocks. The estimated inverse demand elasticity suggests that 
demand for fed beef is elastic with respect to its price (i.e. , an elasticity of (-0.618)-1 = -1.618) 
and is statistically significant at the 1 % leveL The magnitude of this estimate is consistent with 
the empirical literature on the responsiveness of the demand for fed beef to changes in its price 
(Smallwood, Haidacher and Blaylock (1989)). The coefficient for the supply elasticity with respect 
to slaughter is positive and statistically significant at the 1 % leveL This is consistent with the 
theoretical arguments of Aadland and Bailey (2001) that the short-run supply response to transitory 
and permanent price changes in fed beef are generally positive. The sign on In(S) also makes sense 
as it implies that ranchers reduce cull rates in response to lower inventories. Finally, the signs on 
the other variables in (8) and (9) generally agree with our expectations, with the exception of the 
coefficient on the price of chicken (pc) and expected feed prices (pfeede ). 
The final two columns in table 1 report the conjectural elasticity estimates for myopic and 
forward-looking packers.13 We wish to highlight two important features of these behavioral es-
timates for beef-packing firms. First, the coefficient estimates associated with forward-looking 
terms r2 and r3 are statistically significant at the 1% leveL This suggests that beef-packing firms 
are indeed forward-looking and consider dynamic inventory constraints when making purchasing 
decisions. Second, the myopic estimate of the conjectural elasticity parameter (8 = 0.347) is sub-
stantially larger than the forward-looking estimates (8 = 0.189).14 This shows that myopic CV 
estimates are upwardly biased and implies that packers are not exerting as much market power as 
the myopic estimates would suggest.15 
The result that myopic market-power measures tend to overstate the amount of market power 
being exerted is intuitive. Consider, for example, a temporary increase in the demand for beef at 
the retail leveL The positive demand shock will place upward pressure on the retail price of beef. 
To the extent that packers have market power on the output side, they will simultaneously raise 
prices and produce more boxed beef to meet the higher demand for their product. On the input 
13The results in the last column of table 1 are conditioned upon the following parameter values for cattle stock 
dynamics : f3 = 0.96, ,= 0.85 , 6 = 0.1 , (X/x) = 3 and ex = 0.2 . We experimented with other reasonable values for 
these parameters and found the qualitative differences between the myopic and forward-looking estimates of e to be 
robust to these changes . 
14 The myopic estimates are comparable to those of many studies of market power in beef packing. See for example 
Bhuyan and Lopez (1997) , Azzam (1997) , and Schroeter and Azzam (1990). 
15 As a matter of clarification , since we are arguing that myopic estimates of market power are biased, it is not 
strictly valid to discuss their degree of statistical significance because their standard errors are also likely to be 
biased. That said , using the estimated standard errors for the two cases , we would reject the null that the myopic 
and forward-looking conjectural elasticities are equal , even assuming a zero covariance between the two estimates . 
Any positive covariance between estimators (which is likely given the nature of the estimators) would make rejection 
of the null hypothesis even stronger. 
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side, packers are not likely to completely pass the higher prices on to cattle producers because of 
market power and intertemporal stock concerns. In a myopic model, this action by packers and the 
resultant higher market power measure (M) will be perceived as a reflection of their market power. 
In a model that controls for dynamic stock constraints, it is explicitly recognized that packers are 
also concerned about future availability of fed-cattle inputs. By raising input prices too high in the 
current period , t hey will reduce the future breeding stock of cows and thus will be required to offer 
higher future input prices to meet retail demand. To avoid this scenario, packers will optimally 
choose not to pass all of the higher retail price for beef on to cattle producers, at least in part 
because of dynamic inventory constraints. Static models wrongly attribute all of the increased 
price-cost margins to the market power of packers , while dynamic models do not. 
4 Conclusion 
Standard measures of market power are derived from models in which firms are assumed to max-
imize profits period by period without concern for inventory dynamics. However, if inputs can be 
produced only with some lag, firms are likely to account for the effect of their current choices on 
input availability in the future. We present a model which incorporates this intertemporal link. 
Our model gives an exact characterization of the bias that is created when the standard (static) 
framework is applied to an inherently dynamic problem. While the bias does not disappear even 
in the steady state, it cannot be theoretically signed. 
To examine the issue further, we apply this model to the beef-packing industry, using aggregate 
data from 1933 through 1999. This industry provides a good test of the model, as increased 
concentration in beef-packing continues to be a major policy issue in the United States, although 
most previous studies of market power in beef packing ignore the intertemporal considerations 
necessitated by stock dynamics. 
We find that myopic market-power measures tend to overstate the degree of packer market 
power. Consistent with many theoretical models , we find that consideration of future periods 
appears to constrain the firm's ability to exercise current market power. Thus , we provide an 
interesting extension to many previous tests of market power in beef packing. OUT results support 
the conclusion that packers appear to have limited ability to reduce the prices they pay for fed 
cattle. Given that controlling for intertemporal considerations reduces the market-power measure 
by nearly 50%, we find even further support for the claim that packers do not exercise market 
power through their input prices. Whether this result is robust to alternative, and perhaps less 
14 
aggregated, data sets remains an open question. 
A Derivation of Theoretical Market-Power Measures 
The firm chooses xi in each period to maximize its discounted profit stream: 
00 
max L jJt [{p(Xt ) - w(Xt, St)} x~ - c(xD] 
{x' } t=O 
subject to St+l = f(St , Xt) and So given. 
There are two terms of interest. Dividing through by jJt, they are 
Noting the dependence of variables on X t and St, and taking the derivative of this equation with 
respect to x~ and setting it to zero gives 
where Pt == p(Xt ), p~ == p' (Xt ) , and similarly for wand all variables subscripted with t + 1. Now we 
need to find expressions for dx~+ 1 / dx~, dSt+ 1 / dx~ and dXt+ 1 / dx~. The first two can be calculated 
as follows 
dX~~l = dX~+l dSt~l = dX~+l (dSt+1 dXt ) = dX~+l (fx E;J 
dx~ dSt+ 1 dx~ dSt+ 1 dXt dx~ dSt+ 1 
Next , we must calculate dXt+1 / dx~. Recall that X t+1 = X~+l (St+l) + x~+l (x~+l (St+l), St+l). This 
implies that 
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dxt~l (1 + dX~+l) + 8x~+1 dSt+1 
dx~ dX~+l 8St+1 dx~ 
dx~+ 1 i 8x~+ 1 dSt+ 1 
--. .m+l +----. dx~ 8St+1 dx~ 
dX~+l fX~~+l + 8xi+l fx~ 
dSt+1 8St+1 
i [dX~+l i 8xi+1] fx.m -dS .m+l+ -8S . 
t+l t+l 
Plugging these three values into the first-order condition, we obtain 
We define At = {Pt - Wt - Ca + {p~ - WX,t} X~~, N t+1 = {P~+l - WX,t+dX~+l 
and ~ = - (f3fx ~/Pt) [At+l(dx~+l/dSt+l) + N t+1 (8xi+l/8St+l) - WS,t+lX~+ l ]' 
From the previous equation, t he (closed-loop) price-cost margin can be written as 
i pi I Pt - Wt - WX,tXt.Ltrt - Ct 
Pt 
p' ()i -~X~~ + ~ = -~ + ~. 
Pt ct 
Let Me denote the measure of oligopsony power, which is given by the difference between net 
marginal revenue product and the input price, normalized by the input price. Manipulating the 
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first-order equation, we obtain 
M~ = + 
I i p i I Pt - Wt PtXti"t - Ct 
Wt 
wX,tx~R~ f3fx~ [A dX~+l N axi+l i ] 
- --- t+l -dS + t+l -as - WS,t+l Xt+ l Wt Wt t+l t+l 
ei 
---.!+r 
1]t 
B Derivation of the Empirical Market-Power Measures 
As before , the firm 's problem is 
00 
max L f3t [{p(Xt ) - W (Xt, St)} x~ - c(x~)] 
{xt} t=O 
subject to St+l = loSt + 12St-2 - X t and So given. 
There are four terms of interest from this discounted stream of profits: 
f3t [{p(Xt ) - W (Xt , St)} x~ - c(x~)] 
+ f3t+1 [{p(Xt+1 ) - W (Xt+1 , St+l)} X~+l - C(X~+l)] 
+ f3t+2 [{p(Xt+2) - W (Xt+2 , St+2)} X~+2 - C(X~+2)] 
+ f3t+3 [{p( X t+3) - W (Xt+3 , St+3)} x~+3 - c( X~+3 )] . 
Dividing through by f3 t , noting the dependence of variables on Xt+k and St+k for k = 1, 2, 3, taking 
the derivative with respect to x~, and setting the derivative equal to zero gives 
=0 
where dSt/ dx~ = o. 
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This equation can rewritten as 
o Pt - Wt - C/(X~) + {p~ - WX,t} X~~ 
3 [. ] ~ 13k { I (i )} dX~+k {' } i R i i dSt+k + L Pt+k - Wt+k - C Xt+k dxi + Pt+k - WX ,t+k Xt+k .J.'1;+k - WS,t+kXt+k dxi . 
k=l t t 
Recall that from the stock dynamics equation dSt+1 /dXt = -1. As in appendix A, we need to 
calculate dX~+k/ dxL dSt+k/ dx~ and dXt+k/ dx~. 
The first two derivatives can be written as: 
dX~+k _ dX~+k dSt+k _ dX~+k (dSt+k dSt+ 1 dXt ) = _ dX~+k (dSt+k ~) . 
dx~ - dSt+k dx~ - dSt+k dSt+1 dXt dx~ dSt+k dSt+1 
To calculate the third derivative, recall that X t+k = x~+k(St+k) + x~+k(x~+k(St+k)' St+k). Taking 
the derivative with respect to x~+k gives 
By the dynamic stock constraint above, dSt+2/dSt+l = ')'0 and dSt+3/dSt+l = ')'~ . 
Substituting all these terms into the first-order condition for firm i, and defining A and N as 
in appendix A above, gives: 
Translating to summation notation leads to equation (7). 
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C Derivation of the Estimating Equation 
We define d1 = (dxUdSt ) , d2 = (8x1/8St ) , and assume that c~ is constant over time, and e~ is 
constant across firms and over time. Recall that our log-linear demand and supply equations give 
P~+k = b1(pt+k / Xt+k), WX,t+k = Cl(Wt+k/Xt+k) and WS,t+k = C2(Wt+k/St+k) . Equation (7) then 
simplifies to 
where e is the conjectural elasticity parameter defined above; a = c'[1-d1e(X/xi)(,B+,82--Yo+,83--Y6)], 
d1 and d2 are assumed to be constant over time; C3 ,t is an added stochastic error term; and 
D Data Appendix 
Unless otherwise stated, the data are taken from Agricultural Statistics, an annual publication of 
the USDA. The table numbers in Agricultural Statistics vary over time, so only table numbers for 
select years are shown. Our stock variable (S) is measured by the number of cows and heifers that 
have calved as of January 1 in the U.S. (Table 7-2 , 1999). Total slaughter (X) is given by the 
total annual number of federally inspected slaughtered heifers in the U.S. , including imported live 
animals (Table 7-18, 1999). Prices per 100 pounds for choice fed heifers (w) and commercial cull 
cows (pcow) are , prior to 1968, given by the market price at Chicago and after 1968, are given 
by the market price paid to farmers at Omaha (Table 7-9, 1999). Since the price of heifers series 
begins in 1964, we substitute the price of choice steers prior to 1964. Output prices (p) are given 
by the average wholesale price per 100 pounds for select commercial dressed heifers and steers 
(600-700 lb.) from 1933 through 1988 (Table 401 , 1989). For 1989-1999, we use the central U.S. 
wholesale price for dressed boxed-beef cut-out obtained from the Livestock , IVIeat & Wool Division 
of the Agricultural IVIarketing Service, USDA. The final three agricultural series are the U.S. price 
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of broiler chickens per pound (pc) (Table 8-45, 1999), the average U.S. price received by farmers 
for hogs per pound (pp) (Table7-33, 1999), and the U.S. price of feed index (pfeed) (1992-4 = 100) 
(Table 9-33 , 1999). U.S. nominal disposable income (di) is obtained from the NBER Macrohistory 
Database (http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory /contents/) for the period 1933-1946 and 
from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED ; http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/index.html) 
after 1946. The U.S. consumer price index for all goods and services (1967 = 100), which is used to 
deflate all nominal prices, is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://stats.bls.gov /). 
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Table l. Instrumental Variables Estimation Results (Annual Data 1933 - 1999) 
Exp lanatory 
Dependent Variables 
Variables mew) In(p) (p-w) (p-w) 
Constant 6.445* -0.432 0.016 -0.023 (1.848) (-1.283) (0 .797) (-1.040) 
In(X) 0.547*** -0.618*** (2 .600) ( -4.226) 
In(di) 0.209 (l.382) 
In(pc) -0.605*** (-3.575) 
In(pp) 0.703*** (6.719) 
In(S) -2.195** (-2.025) 
In(pcow) forecast 0.547*** (7.900) 
In(pfeed) forecast 1.025*** (2.736) 
(ClW - blP) 0.347*** (7.357) 
(ClW - blP + C2 r l) 
0.189*** 
(3.214) 
r2 0.048*** (2.849) 
r3 0.204*** (8.149) 
Notes: t statistics are in parentheses. (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at 
the 1,5 and 10 percent levels respectively. The coefficients for the box-beef dummy (unity 
after 1988; zero otherwise) and the input-price dummy (unity after 1963; zero otherwise) 
are excluded. 
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Abstract 
This paper incorporates inventory dynamics into an analysis of market power. Using a model 
in which each firm accounts for the effect of its current action on the current and future actions 
of itself and its competitors, we show that measures of market power that ignore inventory 
dynamics are biased. We then apply the model to the beef-packing industry using annual 
data on cattle stocks, slaughter and prices from 1933-1999. Our estimates suggest that static 
measures overestimate the amount of market power exerted by beef-packing firms . 
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1 Introduction 
Many studies of market power are based on measures derived from a static model of competition. 
For example, in examining market power, the Department of Justice r~lies on the Lerner index, 
various concentration ratios , and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, all of which are derived from a 
model of competition that assumes firms maximize profits period by period. Intertemporal effects 
are not easily accounted for in these standard measures. Yet we know that current output choices 
may affect future possibilities through inventory dynamics. If there is a lag in input production, 
decisions regarding how much input to use in one period may influence how much is available in 
the future. Models which account for these inventory dynamics will thus more accurately describe 
competition. Using an oligopoly/oligopsony model of competition, we provide an exact character-
ization of how inventory dynamics affect market-power measures. We then apply our model to 
the beef-packing industry and demonstrate that ignoring inventory dynamics does indeed lead to 
biased estimates of market power. 
Several papers have examined the appropriateness of using a static framework to model dynamic 
competition (see, for example Pindyck (1985), Riordan (1985), Driskill and McCafferty (1989), 
Fershtman and Kamien (1987), and Dockner (1992)). The paper most similar to ours is Roberts 
and Samuelson (1988). They develop a dynamic conjectural variations (CV) model that examines 
the effect of advertising on product demand. As in our model, advertising affects both current 
and future profits, which will be recognized by sophisticated firms. There are, however, important 
differences between the two studies. First, in contrast to Roberts and Samuelson (1988), who 
compare open and closed-loop equilibrium strategies, we compare a closed-loop equilibrium with 
one derived from a static model. l Since the static model is the standard framework for estimating 
market power in beef packing, it facilitates easier comparison to others in the literature. Second, our 
inventory measure is the total U.S. stock of cows, for which data are readily available and which has 
well-known laws of motion. In contrast, the inventory measure in Roberts and Samuelson (1988) is 
the stock of consumer goodwill that cigarette advertising generates , for which data are not directly 
available and dynamics are not well understood. 
As in Riordan (1985) , Driskill and McCafferty (1989) and Fershtman and Kamien (1987), we 
find that firms appear more competitive in an explicitly dynamic model than in the standard (static) 
1 An "open-loop" solution assumes that a firm 's current period choice may affect its rivals ' current period choices 
and its own future choices , but not its rivals' future choices. A "closed-loop" solution allows all three effects to be 
non-zero. 
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